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THE BP OIL SPILL LITIGATION AND EVOLVING
SUPERVISION OF MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION JUDGES
Edward F. Sherman*
I. INTODucTION
The BP Oil Spill Litigation presents some of the most challenging is-
sues for court administration in any piece of complex litigation. The very
magnitude of the litigation-involving dozens of different kinds of claims
across the five Gulf states directly affected but also numerous claims from
outside that area and based on a wide range of tort, environmental, statu-
tory, and maritime law-reflects the problems it poses. Unlike most single
event disasters like plane crashes, bridge collapses, or even the 9/11 attack
on the World Trade Center, the BP Oil Spill Litigation involves a broad
range of claims from death and personal injury to environmental and prop-
erty damage to economic losses in a variety of occupations and commercial
enterprises. Crafting manageable procedures for judicial resolution of such
an amorphous collection of claims has fallen on the judge to whom the
federal court cases were transferred under by the Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation (MDL). This Article will look at the still-developing procedures
that take place under MDL and how court-administration techniques are
being creatively used to establish a manageable process for payment of
claims, settlement, or trial.
II. THE MDL PROCESS
The Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) device, created by legislation in
1968 in response to a crisis caused by large numbers of electrical equipment
price-fixing cases flooding the federal courts t was a modest procedural de-
velopment. A panel of federal judges, the U.S. Panel on Multidistrict Liti-
gation, could transfer cases with "common questions of fact" to a single
federal judge "for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings." 2 Co-
ordinated discovery was the principal benefit, ensuring that all the cases
could share discovery that would be rationally scheduled and thus avoid
wasteful repetition. Over the years the "transferee judge" to whom the
cases were transferred came to assert a more prominent managerial role
* W.R. Irby Chair and Moise S. Steeg, Jr. Professor of Law, Tulane Law School.
1. See 15 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 386 (3d ed. 1998).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000).
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over the litigation, making dispositive pretrial rulings on motions3 and en-
couraging settlement.4  The 1997 Supreme Court's Lexecon decision,5
which required transferee judges to return all the cases to their original
courts when pretrial is completed, prevented the use of MDL for trial con-
solidation of all the cases. However, today creative approaches by trans-
feree judges are giving new importance to the MDL device for resolving
the totality of the litigation with finality.
Perhaps the most critical decision the Panel has to make is the selec-
tion of the judge to whom an MDL case is transferred. Geographical loca-
tion is a factor, as where most of the witnesses and evidence are located, 6
but it is often availability and experience that accounts for transfer to a
particular judge. Since the BP oil spill directly affected five Gulf of Mexico
states, there were a number of plausible federal district courts to which the
federal cases might be transferred. The Eastern District of Louisiana in
New Orleans was an obvious choice since the oil spill was closest geograph-
ically to that venue and the impact on persons and property was greatest
there. Plaintiff attorneys favored the Eastern District of Louisiana, but at-
torneys for various defendant companies favored the district court for the
Southern District of Texas in Houston. Houston was the defendant Tran-
samerica's headquarters and the undisputed center of the oil industry with
the other defendants having significant contacts there. The defendants also
petitioned the panel for the appointment of a particular federal judge in
Houston who had considerable experience with oil cases and was consid-
ered to be sensitive to the practices of the oil industry.' Respected judges
in New Orleans with extensive experience with MDL's, such as Judge
3. Stanley A. Weigel, The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, Transferor Courts and
Transferee Courts, 78 F.R.D. 575, 582-83 (1978) ("It is generally accepted that a transferee judge has
authority to decide all pretrial motions, including motions that may be dispositive, such as motions for
judgment approving a settlement, for dismissal, for judgment on the pleadings, for summary judgment,
for involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b), for striking an affirmative defense, for voluntary dismissal
under Rule 41(a) and to quash service of process.").
4. MANUAL FOR COMPLEx LITIGATION (THIRD) § 31.132 (1995) ("One of the values of mul-
tidistrict proceedings is that they bring before a single judge all of the cases, parties, and counsel com-
prising the litigation. They therefore afford a unique opportunity for the negotiation of a global
settlement. Experience shows that few cases are remanded for trial; most multidistrict litigation is set-
tled in the transferee court. In managing the litigation, therefore, the transferee judge should take
appropriate steps to make the most of this opportunity and facilitate the settlement of the federal and
any related state cases.").
5. Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 28 (1998).
6. Gregory Hansel, Extreme Litigation: An Interview with Judge Wm. Terrell Hodges, Chairman
of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, 19 ME. BAR J. 16, 16 (2004) ("If the Panel is inclined to
order transfer, it then considers many factors in deciding where to transfer cases. These include the
convenience of parties and witnesses, the whereabouts of documents and things, the location of counsel,
the site of accidents, the location of related grand juries, the so-called center of gravity of the litigation,
the experience of the courts, the speed of courts' dockets, availability of facilities for travel, the location
of parties' corporate headquarters, whether cases are pending in possible transferee courts, the level of
interest of potential transferee courts and the location of the first-filed case."). See also John G.
Heyburn II, A View from the Panel: Part of the Solution, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2225, 2241 (2008) ("Ulti-
mately, the Panel's goal is to pair an experienced, knowledgeable, motivated, and available judge in a
convenient location with a particular group of cases.").
7. Scott Hiaasen & Curtis Morgan, BP Seeks Oil- Tested Judge on Lawsuits, MIAMI HERALD,
May 27, 2010, at 1A Front ("U.S. District Judge Lynn Hughes[ ] has traveled the world giving lectures
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Eldon Fallon and Stanwood Duval, already had very demanding dockets.8
The Panel chose another New Orleans judge, Judge Carl J. Barbier, who
had extensive complex litigation experience, specialized knowledge of and
experience in maritime law, both as a practicing attorney and after being
appointed to the Bench, and an excellent reputation for fairness and ability
to work with counsel9
Upon being appointed transferee judge, Judge Barbier began holding
conferences with counsel to establish a framework for categorizing and or-
ganizing the cases.'0 He appointed plaintiff1 and defendant'
2 liaison coun-
sel, plaintiff and defendant steering committees, and a special master.'
3
The first status conference was held on September 16, 2010, at which about
two hundred attorneys from all over the country attended, spilling over
into another room.14 They represented plaintiffs in the thousands of cases
transferred to the MDL (both originally and as "tag along" cases filed after
the original transfer order) as well as the defendants named up to that time
in the various complaints.' 5  Case activity and proceedings since the initial
conference have included a large variety of discovery and managerial
* 16issues.
on ethics for the American Association of Petroleum Geologists, a professional association and re-
search group that works with BP and other oil companies.").
8. Judge Fallon received MDL transfers of the Propulsid, Vioxx, and Chinese Dry Wall Litiga-
tions, and Judge Duval of the Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation.
9. On August 10, 2010, the Panel on Multidistrict Litigation issued an order transferring the
cases to Judge Carl J. Barbier. Transfer Order at 5, In re: Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon"
in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179 (E.D. La. Aug. 10, 2010), available at http://
www.laed.uscourts.gov/OilSpill/Orders/MDL-TransferOrder.pdf.
10. Edward F. Sherman, The MDL Model for Resolving Complex Litigation If a Class Action Is
Not Possible, 82 Tut. L. REV. 2205, 2209-10 (2008) ("In contrast to the stringent rules that govern class
actions, MDL is a looser and more flexible structure allowing for transfer and consolidation based on
pragmatic considerations. . . . This enables the MDL transferee judge to begin the pretrial process
immediately with little likelihood that the transfer will be overturned and to structure it for the
broadest possible settlement.").
11. Louisiana attorneys Stephen J. Herman and James P. Roy.
12. Attorneys J. Andrew Langan, Don K. Haycroft, Deborah D. Kuchler, Ky E. Kirby, Michael
J. Lyle, David J. Beck, Philip A. Witttmann, Donald E. Godwin, and Kerry J. Miller.
13. Professor Francis E. McGovern, Duke University School of Law.
14. Jef Feeley & Margaret Cronin Fisk, BP Will Face Thousands of Spill Cases, Judge Says,
BLOOMBERG, Sept. 16, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.comlnews/2010-09-16/bp-spill-victims-clash-at-first-
new-orleans-hearing-on-combined-cases.html.
15. For example, the operator of the rig, BP, the owner of the rig Transocean, the contractor that
worked on the underwater operations, Halliburton, the parties to a joint operating agreement with BP,
Anadarko E & P Company and MOEX Offshore 2007, the manufacturer of a safety valve, Weatherford
International, and the manufacturer of the blowout preventer, Cameron International Corp. See Rob-
ert Force, Martin Davies & Joshua S. Force, Deepwater Horizon: Removal Costs, Civil Damages,
Crimes, Civil Penalties, and State Remedies in Oil Spill Cases, 85 Tut. L. REV. 889, 898 (2011).
16. For example, privilege and confidentiality issues, deposition protocol, preservation of docu-
ments and electronically stored information, subpoenas, filing of master complaints and other pleadings
and deeming of responses, joint investigation teams, and access to the blowout preventer, machinery
and sites.
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III. CASE MANAGEMENT
An early central task for managing the litigation was how to divide up
the widely-varying claims into manageable groupings. The attorneys and
court coined the phrase "pleading bundles" to describe the categories to
which the cases were assigned. The court approved bundles for a number
of claims. 7  The bundles were intended to be flexible and subject to
change. They reflected recognition that while all the claims share some
basic core issues, such as the liability of the various defendants for the ex-
plosion, they may have significant differences as to other issues and de-
fenses. The bundles are an attempt to group claims with similar issues so
that they might be addressed and possibly resolved independently of other
bundles. A number of the bundles are characterized by the type of claim-
ant, for example, private individuals, businesses, emergency responders, or
governmental entities; or by the nature of the injury, for example, personal
injury or death, property damage, economic loss, or clean-up expenses; or
by the cause of action, for example, arising under the Oil Pollution Act of
1990 (OPA),18 state statutory and common laws, and maritime law.
Governmental entities-federal, states, parishes or counties, and locali-
ties-many have claims for injury to their own property, revenues, and in-
terests, or as parens patriae on behalf of their citizens. At the first status
conference, states such as Louisiana and the Justice Department on behalf
of the United States urged the court to separate their suits from the other
cases." They objected to the attorneys on the Plaintiffs' Steering Commit-
tee (PSC) representing them, claiming that state agencies in some states
17. Bundle A, Personal Injury and Death; B, Private Individuals and Business Loss Claims (bro-
ken down into Bi, Non-Governmental Economic Loss and Property Damages; B2, RICO pleadings;
B3, Post-Explosion Clean-Up Claims; B4, Post-Explosion Emergency Responder Clams); C, Public
Damage Claims; D, Injunctive and Regulatory Claims (broken down into D1, Claims Against Private
Parties, and D2, Claims Against the Government, Official, or Agency); and E, Designation of Subse-
quently-Added Cases. Pretrial Order No. 11 [Case Management Order No. 1J at 2-5, In re: Oil Spill by
the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179 (E.D. La.
Oct. 19, 2010), available at http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/OilSpill/Orders/PTOl1.pdf.
18. 33 U.S.C. § 2704 (2006) (OPA imposes liability on parties responsible for an oil spill for
removal costs, damages, natural resource damages, and economic losses). See generally Force, Davies,
& Force, supra note 15.
19. The State of Louisiana petitioned the Fifth Circuit for a writ of mandamus directing the
district court to amend its pretrial orders creating "bundles" rather that a separate track for govern-
mental claims, which it said infringed its sovereignty and violated its law. The writ was denied, holding
that the decisions were within the court's discretion to
(1) consolidate and organize the relevant claims into 'pleading bundles' rather than separate
litigation tracks; (2) bifurcate the liability and damages phases of the litigation; (3) schedule a
liability trial for early 2012; (4) appoint lead, liaison, and coordinating counsel; and (5) pro-
mulgate pretrial procedures for common discovery efforts leading up to the liability trial.
It found this discretion particularly grounded in Rules 16, 26, 37, 42, and 83, and cited Rule 16(c) as
expressly authorizing courts to adopt "special procedures for managing potentially difficult or pro-
tracted actions that may involve complex issues, multiple parties, difficult legal questions, or unusual
proof problems." In re State of Louisiana, Petition for writ of Mandamus, No. 11-30178 (5th Cir. Apr.
11, 2011).
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were barred by law from paying contingency fees (e.g., Louisiana). 2 0 Gov-
ernmental entities also objected to having to share in any attorney's fees or
expenses that might be awarded as to "common fund" payments that might
ultimately be ordered by the court to be made by all plaintiffs?' Judge
Barbier did not grant the request for separation, but did appoint the U.S.
Attorney General's office and the Attorney General of the state of Ala-
bama (as a representative of the states) to be "coordinating counsel" on
behalf of the governmental entities and to be included in the conferences
and communications between the court and the steering committees.
22
Scheduling of a trial or trials in as complex cases as the BP Oil Litiga-
tion is a challenging task. Bellwether trials of a small number of individual
cases have become a favored technique for giving parties in complex litiga-
tion a sense of the strength of their cases, hopefully to lead to settlement.
2 3
Judge Barbier discussed use of bellwether trials, but the special circum-
stance of this case arising out of maritime law has led to a relatively early
trial date for what could be a comprehensive trial of many of the issues.
Under maritime law, the owner of a vessel (which the BP oil rig is
considered) is entitled to file a complaint for a "Limitation" proceeding in
which all persons with maritime or state law claims resulting from an oil
spill must bring their claims against it in one proceeding. This right comes
from the Shipowner's Limitation of Liability Act 2 4 passed by Congress in
1851 to help American vessels compete with foreign vessels that were pro-
tected by similar laws. The liability of the owner for loss by any person of
property, goods, or merchandise on board, or for any damage or injury
20. Amanda Bronstad, States Seek Distance from Other BP Plaintiffs, THENAT'L L. J., Jan. 17,
2011 available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=120
2 4 7 80 6 7 05 6 &States-seek-
distancefromother_BPplaintiffs.
21. Rebecca Mowbray, State Fights Proposal to Lump Its BP Oil Spill Litigation Together with
Other Suits, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 6, 2010, available at http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-
oil-spill/index.ssf2010/10/stateifightstproposaltoump.html Rebecca Mowbray, Judge Defends Deci-
sion to Deny the Government a Separate Track in Oil Spill Litigation, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE,
Jan. 29, 2011, available at http://www.nola.com/business/index.ssf/2011/01/judgedefends-decision-
tojdeny.html.
22. Michael Kunzelman, Judge Defends Spill Decision That Upset La. AG, BLOOMBERG, Jan. 28,
2011, available at http://gulfofmexicooilspillblog.com/2011/01/28/gulf-of-mexico-oil-spill-blog-u-s-district
-judge-carl-barbier-alabama-ag-appointment/ (after Louisiana Attorney General James Caldwell criti-
cized the appointment of Alabama AG Luther Strange, Judge Barbier stated that Alabama is the only
state that had filed a lawsuit over the spill and that Strange's position would not preclude other states'
attorneys general from representing their interests).
23. See Eldon E. Fallon, Jeremy T. Grabill & Robert Pitard Wynne, Bellwether Trials in Multidis-
trict Litigation, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2323, 2337 (2008).
24. 46 U.S.C. app. §181; Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 448 (2001) (the
procedure for filing a complaint in federal court seeking limitation of liability is set out in Supplemental
Admiralty and Maritime Claims Rule F. The limitation court, "sitting without a jury, adjudicates the
claims . . . [and] determines whether the vessel owner is liable and whether the owner may limit liabil-
ity. The court then determines the validity of the claims, and if liability is limited, distributes the limited
funds among the claimants.").
2412011]
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resulting from collision, is limited to the value of vessel2 5 (which, in the
case of the BP oil rig, was said to be about $27 million 2 6).
Transocean filed a Limitation complaint, 27 and Judge Barbier set a
trial date for February 2012. This trial will decide whether Transocean will
be allowed to limit the amount of compensation it owes to victims of the
spill. If it qualifies,2 8 the Limitation trial will determine what it is responsi-
ble to pay and to whom within the limits of the value of vessel.2 9 The limi-
tation act does not apply to claims under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990
(although OPA does have its own provisions limiting liability with different
factors and much higher amounts30). Thus the Limitation proceeding
before Judge Barbier will not address limitation of liability of OPA claims,
but will apply to claims under state laws and general maritime law. The
MDL BP Oil Spill Litigation, including the Limitation proceeding, is sepa-
rate from the claims process established by BP through the Gulf Coast
Claims Facility. Claimants were required to file a claim in the Limitation
proceeding by April 20, 2011 to preserve their rights in that proceeding.
25. 46 U.S.C. app. §183(a).
26. Plaintiffs' Steering Committee, In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in Gulf of
Mexico on Apr. 20, 2010, http://www.bpmdl2179.com/frequently-asked-questions (last visited May, 24,
2011).
27. The complaint was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas but was
transferred to the Eastern District of Louisiana "pursuant to Supplemental Rule F(9) and in the inter-
ests of efficiency and justice" and was consolidated with the BP Oil Spill cases transferred by the Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation. Order at 1, In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf
of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179 (E.D. La. Aug. 24, 2010), available at http://www.laed.
uscourts.gov/OilSpill/Orders/ConsolidationOrder.pdf.
28. Limitation of liability will not apply where there is negligence or a condition of unseaworthi-
ness which the owner of the vessel should have known.
29. Order at 1-2, In re: Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mexico, on
April 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179 (E.D. La. Mar. 15, 2011) (attaching "Commonly Asked Questions"),
available at http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/OilSpill/Orders/31520110rder(FAQ).pdf. See also Letter to
Attorneys from Plaintiffs Steering Committee (PSC) (Mar. 18, 2011).
30. 33 U.S.C. §2704(a) (2006) (Oil Pollution Act limitation of liability provision)(maximum lia-
bility based on type of vessel and tonnage, with typical ranges between $4 and 22 million, and responsi-
bility for removal costs up to $75 million). "A responsible party loses the right to limit its liability if its
gross negligence or willful misconduct proximately caused the incident. Likewise, the right to limit does
not apply where the responsible party's violation of an applicable federal safety, construction, or oper-
ating regulation proximately caused the incident." Force, Davies, & Force, supra note 15, at 947.
31. The Plaintiffs' Steering Committee posted the following information on its web site address-
ing why claimants should file by April 20:
It is important to understand that while, in the typical situation, a pure Oil Pollution Act
(OPA) claim might not be subject to the Limitation complaint filed by Transocean, claims
under both State Law (including the liberal Florida Oil Pollution Act) and General Maritime
Law are subject to the Transocean proceeding. Moreover, while the typical limitation pro-
ceeding might only address Transocean's attempt to limit its liability, it is impossible to predict
the implications of Transocean's 14(c) tender to the plaintiffs of BP and the other defendants,
and the assertions of cross-claims (including contribution, subrogation and indemnity of OPA
and State Law claims) by BP and others within the Limitation, to be tried together, along with
fault, gross fault, and allocation. There are complex and largely res nova issue[s] of [first
impression pertaining to] preemption, presentment, preclusion, mandatory joinder, claim split-
ting, choice-of-law, statute of limitations, collateral estoppel, and res judicata which will not be
resolved by April 20, if ever.
why You Should File, http://www.bpmdl2179.com/'why-you-should-file (last visited May 24, 2011).
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Because of the potential scope of the Limitation proceeding, it appears
that it will involve a comprehensive trial in which not only Transocean's
liability is determined but also that of the other defendants. The Limita-
tion trial is thus itself an aggregative device that permits the MDL court to
hold a trial involving most of the parties and issues (which it could not do
under the MDL statute since it only has jurisdiction for pre-trial over the
transferred cases and is required to return the cases to the courts where
they were originally filed once pre-trial is completed 3 2). The parties have
submitted proposed Trial Plans for the Limitation trial," which, however,
took somewhat different positions as to the scope of the trial.3 4  This is
reminiscent of disagreements as to the scope of other aggregate trial pro-
ceedings involving class actions or consolidations. There will undoubtedly
be further refinements before Judge Barbier establishes the final trial plan.
IV. THE CLAIMS PROCESS
The BP Oil Spill Litigation differs from many other MDL cases be-
cause settlement and claims processes began shortly after the accident and
were in full swing by the time the case had been transferred to the MDL
court. The reason is related to the provisions of the principal statutory
cause of action, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA). OPA created an Oil
Spill Trust Fund (OSLTF), administered by the U.S. Coast Guard, to pay
claims for which a "responsible party" is liable.35  Once designated as a
"responsible party" by the President acting through the Coast guard (as BP
was early on), it must dispense information about how claims can be made
against it. Claimants have to submit a claim for removal costs or damages
32. See text at supra note 5.
33. Trial Plan Brief Submitted by Plaintiffs in Response to the Court's Order of May 18, 2011, In
re: Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, MDL No.
2179 (E.D La. June 4, 2011); Brief of Defendant Cameron International Corporation on Trial Plan
Issues, In re: Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010,
MDL No. 2179 (E.D La. June 6, 2011); BP's Trial Plan Memorandum in Response to May 18, 2011
Order, In re: Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010,
MDL No. 2179 (E.D La. June 6, 2011).
34. See Memorandum in Support of Motion to Adopt Trial Plan Proposed by PSC, Transocean
Limitation Petitioners and the State of Alabama, In re: Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in
the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179 (E.D La. Apr. 13, 2011). ("The Joint Trial Plan
calls for a single trial on the main liability issues that are also the subject of this MDL, with two alloca-
tions of fault among the defendants: (1) for fault associated with the April 20, 1010 blowout and explo-
sion; and (2) for fault associated with the discharge of oil from the well, including post-April 20, 2010
well or 'source control.' The determination of these liability issues and allocations of fault can be made
from a 'single note of evidence,' . . . Conversely the trial plan exchanged by BP on April 4, 2011, calls
for a bare-bones limitation trial with a single fault allocation, and seeks to narrowly limit the trial to (1)
claims for property loss to the Deepwater Horizon Rig and its appurtenances; (2) claims for personal
injury arising from the explosion and fire aboard the rig; and (3) claims for wrongful death arising from
the explosion and fire aboard the rig. Further BP expressly seeks to limit the 'core factual and legal
issues' to be adjudicated and the allocation of fault to 'the initiation of an uncontrolled flow of oil.' In
other words, BP's plan proposed a trial only on fault associated with blowout and explosion . . .)
35. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2705(a), 2713, 2714(b).
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before making a claim against the Fund or filing suit under OPA.3 6 Consis-
tent with OPA, BP set up a claims process and began making payments to
claimants before the creation by BP of the Gulf Coast Claims Facility
(GCCF), which assumed BP's claims responsibilities and before the MDL
transfer of the litigation.3
Claims facilities are of relatively recent origin, but they have become a
central institution in the resolution of complex litigation. Professor Francis
McGovern, of Duke University School of Law and Special Master in this
litigation, has described the development:
"Claims resolution facility" is a generic term used to de-
scribe a wide range of entities that process and resolve
claims made against a potential funding source. In the con-
text of a natural disaster, for example, there might be facili-
ties to process claims based upon insurance policies, federal
or state statutory or administrative rights, international re-
lief efforts, contractual obligations, or any other basis for
receiving economic or noneconomic benefits. These facili-
ties are generally characterized by a large number of claims
that are in need of rapid and efficient resolution.38
The structure and procedures of claims facilities can be quite different
depending on the nature and circumstances involved. Claims facilities are
frequently the product of a settlement to resolve litigation, but they may
also arise out of regulatory or legislative enactments (as in the case of the
OPA) or of insurance, trust, or other contractual obligations. Claims reso-
lution could be accomplished in litigation through appointment of a special
master to serve as claims administrator. The special master rule 3 9 permits a
court to incorporate a claims phase into court resolution of the case, mak-
ing the special master a court surrogate and allowing for apportionment of
his fees and expenses among the parties. That the special master must be
independent and neutral in regards to the parties goes without saying
which is further ensured by the fact that the judge has the final decision-
making authority.
There are a number of common threads that are critical to the accept-
ance of claims processes by parties and claimants and to their success in
36. See Force, Davies, & Force, supra note 15, at 950 ("OPA's presentment requirement is not a
mere procedural technicality, but is a mandatory condition precedent to filing suit against a responsible
party.... In enacting this presentment requirement, Congress sought to promote settlement and avoid
litigation.").
37. Byron G. Stier, The Gulf Coast Claims Facility as Quasi-Public Fund: Transparency and In-
dependence in Claim Administrator Compensation, 30 Miss. C. L. REV. 255, 261 ("This preliminary
claims program dispensed hundreds of millions of dollars to claimants through the end of summer 2010.
Yet tens of thousands of claimants awaited payment, either because of documentation problems or
administrative slowness.").
38. Francis E. McGovern, The What and Why of Claims Resolution Facilities, 57 STAN. L. REV.
1361, 1361-62 (2005).
39. FED. R. Civ. P. 53.
244 [VOL. 30:237
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fulfilling the objectives of the fund. Professor McGovern mentions several
standards for acceptance and approval of a claims facility scheme. First is
"independence, neutrality, and experience."40 Whether a claims facility is
created and overseen by a court, or functions pursuant to administrative or
legislative standards, or operates only under the terms of a private agree-
ment or contract, the features of independence and neutrality are essential.
A claims process should be structured to achieve equity among the claim-
ants, and if the administrator is not independent and neutral, basic fairness
of result cannot be guaranteed. Another standard identified by Professor
McGovern is "judicial supervision." 4 ' Not all claims facilities operate
under court supervision, but since they may serve as an alternative to litiga-
tion, they operate in the shadow of the law, and judicial approval may be
involved. Where, as here, a claims facility operates as a pre-litigation de-
vice, an MDL court having jurisdiction over cases in which claimants are
parties or potential parties may have to exercise supervisory or remedial
authority to ensure fairness in the litigation before it.
The BP Oil Spill Litigation raised questions as to how a claims facility
should be set up. On June 16, 2010, British Petroleum announced the ap-
pointment of Kenneth Feinberg, a noted and highly respected attorney
with extensive experience in claims administration, as administrator of an
"independent claims process" for individuals and businesses injured by the
oil spill.42 The announcement was made by President Obama at a press
conference following a meeting at the White House with BP representa-
tives that resulted in BP establishing a $20 billion fund for claims. The
agreement between Mr. Feinberg and BP was not memorialized in detailed
contractual terms, but the Gulf Coast Claims Facility (GCCF) was estab-
lished under his control and supervision, assuming the duties of administer-
ing the claims process. In establishing this process, BP was acting as a
"responsible party" under the Oil Pollution Act,4 3 succeeding to the claims
process previously created by it to satisfy the requirement to attempt to
resolve claims resulting from the oil spill. Mr. Feinberg apparently con-
sulted with BP concerning both the substantive and procedural standards
for the payment of claims. Although he did not draw a salary, his law firm
would be paid $950,000 a month, in addition to expenses and the possibility
of further compensation." This fee arrangement was not publicized, and
most claimants would not have been aware of it.
The fee arrangement here contrasted with the usual method of pay-
ment of special masters, who are paid on an hourly basis according to the
40. Id. at 1381.
41. Id. at 1387.
42. Questions and Answers Regarding Newly Formed BP Oil Spill Fund, http://www.bpoilspill
lawyersblog.com/2010/06/questions-and-answersregardin.html (last visited May 25, 2011).
43. 33 U.S.C. §§# 2705(a), 2713-2714(b) (2000).
44. In subsequent negotiations, the compensation was increased. Harry R. Webber, BP Increases
Pay for Claims Czar Ken Feinberg's Law Firm to $1.25 Million Per Month, HUFFPOST GREEN, Mar. 25,
2011, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2Oll/03/25/bp-ken-feinberg-claims-salary-pay.n_8408
71.html.
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prevailing market rates in the community. The sizable fee arrangement is
not objectionable in itself; a corporation can enter into a contract with a
private entity to pay well for it to carry out the resolution and payment of
claims on behalf of the corporation. However, the fee arrangement does
reveal a relationship which claimants who are encouraged to go through an
"independent" claims process would have an interest in knowing. Knowl-
edge of the arrangement may or may not make a difference to any particu-
lar claimant, but it could be a factor in a claimant's decision as to whether
to accept an offer by the GCCF. Highly publicized statements by Mr. Fein-
berg and BP that he and the claims facility were independent and only had
an interest in compensating claimants properly should have been capable
of being balanced with this information.
A. Court Supervision over Communications with Claimants
by Claims Facility
In December 2010, the Plaintiffs' Steering Committee filed a motion
with the court to limit certain conduct of the GCCF concerning public
statements and communications with claimants. It objected to a number of
features of the claims process being administered by Mr. Feinberg, includ-
ing encouragement of filing a claim in lieu of participating in the court
litigation, failure to disclose the relationship between Mr. Feinberg and the
facility and BP, and requiring releases of all responsible parties if a claim
offer were accepted.
Concerns about defendants' communications with potential litigants or
class members in an effort to reach settlement or dissuade from litigating
are not new. Defendants who are sued in a class action may attempt to
settle as many of the cases as possible. Settlement may not even be neces-
sary if individual putative class members can be persuaded to opt out of the
class action if it is certified. In Kleiner v. First National Bank of Atlanta,45
the President of a bank that was sued on behalf of a class of borrowers
concerning discriminatory rates organized a campaign to contact their bor-
rowers by telephone. The loan officers were directed to "do the best sell-
ing job they had ever done" to persuade the borrowers to opt out of the
class action.4 6 In a few days, 3,000 borrowers were contacted and 2,800,
representing total loans of almost $700 million, opted out.4 7
When this was brought to the attention of the trial court, the bank
claimed these were purely informational contacts with its borrowers. The
court invalidated the opt outs, held the bank's lawyer in contempt, and
imposed costs on the bank and a $50,000 fine on its counsel. 4 8 The Elev-
enth Circuit affirmed, stating "it is obviously in defendants' interest to di-
minish the size of the class and thus the range of potential liability by
45. 751 F.2d 1193, 1197 (11th Cir. 1985).
46. Id. at 1198.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1199.
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soliciting exclusion requests." 49 It found that such "unsupervised, unilat-
eral communication with the plaintiff class sabotage[s] the goal of informed
consent" and the effectiveness of a class action and was not protected by
the First Amendment.5 0 It also acknowledged the power of a court to en-
sure the fairness and integrity of the litigation process and "to respond to
an unfolding and often unpredictable sequence of events."51
Kleiner was an egregious case in which a court had to act in the face of
actions that would directly undermine the opt-out process being adminis-
tered by the court. The objections of the PSC in the BP Oil Spill Litigation
addressed more subtle influences by a private claims facility that is not
under the authority of the MDL court. However, Judge Barbier had prece-
dents close to home in which Judge Fallon, as the MDL transferee judge in
the Eastern District of Louisiana, had found inherent judicial power to en-
sure the integrity of settlement processes relating to attorneys' fees and as
relating to communications with potential claimants.
1. In re Vioxx Litigation
The first precedent was an order by Judge Fallon in the Vioxx litiga-
tion. Some 20,000 federal court suits against the pharmaceutical company
Merck alleging medical complications from its drug Vioxx had been
MDL'ed to Judge Fallon in the Eastern District of Louisiana. A creative
global settlement was reached between the defendant and plaintiffs' steer-
ing committee that resolved all pending suits in both state and federal
courts.52 There were hundreds of plaintiffs' attorneys from around the
country whose cases were included in the settlement. As often occurs in
settlements of aggregate litigation, the allocation of plaintiffs' attorney's
fees among the plaintiffs' attorneys became an issue. The settlement had
provided for attorneys' fees but had not attempted to determine their allo-
cation among the plaintiffs' attorneys.
The settlement agreement provided for a Fee Allocation Committee
of plaintiffs' attorneys to make recommendations to the judge as to fees to
be paid to individual attorneys and as to the amount of fees to be deposited
in a Common Benefit Fund.53 But before the allocation of fees was finally
made, Judge Fallon, acting sua sponte, entered an order capping all contin-
gent fees at 32%.5 He claimed inherent judicial equitable authority to ex-
amine fee arrangements, and particularly contingent fee arrangements
"where there is a built in conflict of interest"5 5 and "where the claimants in
49. Id. at 1202.
50. Id. at 1203-07.
51. Id. at 1200.
52. See Sherman, supra note 10, at 2213-16.
53. Settlement Agreement Between Merck & Co., Inc. and the Counsel Listed on the Signature
Pages Hereto, Nov. 9, 2007, available at http://www.officialvioxxsettlement.com/documents/Master%
2 0
Settlement%20Agreement%20-%20new.pdf (arts. 9.2.4, .2.5).
54. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 574 F. Supp. 2d 606, 617 (E.D. La. 2008).
55. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., Order and Reasons at 7, MDL No. 1657 (E.D. La., Aug. 3,
2009).
2472011]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
a particular case are vulnerable." 5 6 He also based his authority on the re-
sponsibility of a judge in an MDL proceeding to ensure that claimants are
properly compensated and on the powers given him as "Chief Administra-
tor" under the settlement agreement. Citing case law and state statutes
that limited contingent fees, he determined that 32% was a reasonable per-
centage. He noted that "this reduction will not result in a paltry award"
since 32% of the settlement fund of $4.85 billion would be $1.55 billion for
all attorneys.5 7
A group of five attorneys primarily from Texas and Louisiana (called
the Vioxx Litigation Consortium or VLC), who had contingent fee con-
tracts with their individual clients in excess of 32% (many of them at 40%),
challenged this order. The VLC attorneys argued that the court lacked
authority to supervise, and particularly to cap, contingent fees. They
pointed out that this was not a class action, where a court must approve a
settlement, and that the MDL statute has no comparative requirement:
"Class action rules do not become applicable simply because a large num-
ber of cases settle. Individual differences remain, not only as to the charac-
teristics of each individual claim, but also as to the relationship between
each plaintiff and his attorney."" The policy reasons for court review of
attorney's fees in class actions, they argued, do not apply to this case trans-
ferred and consolidated under MDL: "Unlike a class action, there are no
'nonparty' or 'absentee' plaintiffs in this MDL. Each plaintiff is personally
represented by the attorney of his choice."5 9 The terms of a contingent fee,
they maintained, are particularly a matter for the attorney and client, and
imposition of this cap was unreasonable and could ultimately lead to clients
being unable to engage skilled attorneys who would be willing to take the
risk of financing a long and difficult piece of litigation.6 0
This raised a question as to whether the analogy to a class action is
valid for an MDL judge in a consolidated action to have the authority to
supervise and review attorney's fees in the interests of fairness. Judge Fal-
lon had used the phrase "quasi-class action" to describe MDLs in invoking
the court's equitable powers to review the Vioxx attorney's fees.61 Other
courts have also used the "quasi-class action" analogy to confer equitable
authority to review attorney's fees62 (and a number of states have imposed
56. Id. at 19.
57. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 574 F. Supp. 2d at 618.
58. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration/Revision of Order Capping Contin-
gent Fees and Alternatively for Entry of Judgment at 7, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657
(E.D. La. Dec. 10, 2008).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 3, 21-22.
61. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 574 F. Supp. 2d at 612.
62. In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1708, 2008 WL
682174, at *17-19 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2008), amended in part by In re Guidan, 2008 WL 3896006 (D.
Minn. Aug. 21, 2008) (capping contingent fees at 20% subject to appeal to a special master for an
upward departure based on certain factors); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 491
(E.D.N.Y. 2006) (capping contingent fees at 35% with departure in either direction based on unique
facts of a given case); In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., 1994 WL 114580, at *4 (N.D.
Ala. 1994) (capping contingent fees at 25% of a $4.2 billion settlement fund). For an opposing view of
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contingent fee-capping statutes).6 3 They point out that policies supporting
monitoring contingent fees in class actions also apply to MDL consolida-
tions which have a large number of plaintiffs subject to one settlement ma-
trix, use court-appointed special masters to help administer the settlement,
create a large escrow fund, and involve other court interventions.' The
argument is that the MDL form of aggregate litigation has so altered the
traditional single-party lawsuit through a high degree of court supervision
and aggregate procedures that judicial supervision of attorneys' fees, a la
class actions, is authorized. 65
The MDL statute itself provides some support for this position. It di-
rects the MDL panel to centralize cases only when it is possible to strike a
balance between efficiency and fairness. 6 6 Since the Panel exerts no over-
sight once the cases are transferred, it is up to the transferee judge to use
equitable authority to ensure that the aggregate procedures achieve the
proper balance. The transferee court is encouraged to be innovative, as
"the complexity, diversity, and volume of mass tort claims require adapting
traditional procedures to new contexts." 67 Thus the argument is that
whatever the strength of the class action analogy, consolidated MDL cases
warrant judicial supervision of attorney's fees to protect the interests of the
claimants against undue erosion of their recoveries by excessive attorney's
fees.
Judge Fallon saw the interests of the claimants to be adverse to that of
the plaintiffs' attorneys as to attorney fees. "District courts," he said, "nec-
essarily retain the authority to examine attorney fees sua sponte because
the attorneys' interests in this regard are in conflict with those of their cli-
ents."" Two MDL cases also premised judicial review of contingent fees
on the proposition that plaintiffs' counsel have a built-in conflict of inter-
est.6 9 The VLC attorneys saw a court's legitimate concerns as much more
judicial supervision of attorney's fees, see Charles Silver & Gregory Miller, The Quasi-Class Action
Method of Managing Multidistrict Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107 (2010).
63. See N.J. R. CT. 1:21-7 (an attorney in a products liability action "shall not contract for,
charge, or collect a contingent fee in excess of the following limits: (1) 33 1/3 % on the first $500,000
recovered; (2) 30% on the next $500,000 recovered; (3) 25% on the next $500,000 recovered; (4) 20%
on the next $500,000 recovered."); CAL. Bus. & PROF'L CODE § 6146(a) (providing a sliding scale
framework for limiting contingent fees in actions against healthcare providers); TEx LAB. CODE ANN.
§ 408.221 (limiting contingent fee arrangements in worker's compensation lawsuits to 25% of the plain-
tiff's net recovery).
64. See In re Guidant, supra note 62, at *18; In re Zyprexa, supra note 62, at 491.
65. See Edward F. Sherman, Judicial Supervision of Attorney Fees in Aggregate Litigation: The
American Vioxx Experience as an Example for Other Countries, in JANET WALKER & OSCAR G.
CHASE, COMMON LAW CIVIL LAW AND THE FUTURE OF CATEGORIES 557-70 (2010).
66. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2000).
67. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FouRTH) § 22.1 (2004).
68. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 574 F. Supp. 2d 606, 612 (E.D. La. 2008); In re Vioxx Prods.
Liab. Litig., Order and Reasons, supra note 55, at 10 (Judge Fallon appointed the Tulane Law School
Civil Litigation Clinic "to represent the interests of claimants whose settlement awards will be affected
by the Court's Capping Order" and denied the objection by the VLC).
69. In re Guidant, supra note 62, at *18; In re Zyprexa, supra note 62, at 491-92. See also Farm-
ington Dowel Prods. Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 61, 87, 90 n.62 (1st Cir. 1969) (holding that a court
has the authority to examine contingency fee contracts in order to ensure that it is not an unwitting
accessory to excessive, unreasonable fees being charged).
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limited, pointing out that two circuit court cases permitting courts to moni-
tor contingent fees had been in the context of seamen and children, who
required special protection. 70 They focused on a Fifth Circuit case that re-
versed a sanction against attorneys and its language that a federal court's
inherent powers consist of those "necessary" for the courts to manage their
affairs and extend only to litigation before the court, or, in the case of a
sanction, to disobedience of the court's orders.7 '
If the mix of inherent judicial powers, analogy to class actions, the
MDL statute, and the altered status of the attorney-client relationship
under MDL consolidation is enough to justify Judge Fallon's capping order,
a question is how far that authority goes. 7 2 Is it present in all MDL consoli-
dations (even though the statute does not specifically provide for it)? Is it
present in all consolidated cases since they necessarily involve replacing the
primary representation of the individual's attorney with an altered aggre-
gate form of representation? Or is it present only in some MDL and ordi-
nary consolidation cases in which there are special concerns over a conflict
of interest between attorneys and clients or special needs for a more expan-
sive form of case management? And, relevant to the BP Oil Spill Litiga-
tion, does such authority reach beyond supervision of attorney's fees to
other matters - such as communications and practices of a claims facility
that is independent of the litigation in the MDL court?
2. Turner v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc.
A day after Katrina struck, a crude oil tank at the Murphy Oil Refin-
ery became ruptured and discharged crude oil into the surrounding area in
St. Bernard Parish outside New Orleans. Nineteen cases filed as class ac-
tions were consolidated and assigned to Judge Fallon. Plaintiffs' counsel
filed a motion asking the court to supervise communications between Mur-
phy Oil and putative class members. Judge Fallon determined that "a dis-
trict court may freely prohibit false or misleading speech by a defendant,
and may restrict a defendant from using methods of speech that are inher-
ently coercive or prone to abuse, like oral solicitation."73  He made the
following rulings:
70. Karim v. Finch Shipping Co., 374 F.3d 302, 304 (5th Cir. 2004); Rosquist v. Soo Line R.R.,
692 F.2d 1107, 1109 (7th Cir. 1982).
71. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 58, at 9 (citing F.D.I.C.
v. Maxxam, Inc., 523 F.3d 566, 590-91 (5th Cir. 2008)).
72. See Jeremy T. Grabill, Judicial Review of Private Mass Tort Settlements, 42 SETON HALL L.
REV. (forthcoming Jan. 2012) ("It is unfortunate that these courts have based their regulation of attor-
neys' fees, at least in part, on the quasi-class action theory when the inherent judicial authority to
ensure that contingency fees are not excessive is well established. Unlike some commentators, I be-
lieve there is a compelling logic in ensuring that plaintiffs from around the country brought together in
mass tort litigation pay the same percentage contingency fee to their attorneys when all of their claims
are resolved in a centralized forum. **** But by involving a quasi-class action theory to regulate contin-
gency fees, courts have muddied the waters and added to the confusion that now exists concerning the
proper role for courts to play more generally vis-A-vis private mass tort settlements.").
73. Order and Reasons at 4, Turner v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., No. 05-4206, dated Nov. 14, 2006.
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Open Letters and Advertisements - Murphy had published
two open letters and one full-page advertisement in local
papers stating that most of the oil had been recovered or
evaporated and that it will contact residents who had previ-
ously called it regarding settlement of their claims. Murphy
was ordered to begin any communication with putative class
members with a statement that the individual has a right to
consult with an attorney prior to a settlement or waiver of
legal rights. In addition, Murphy may not initiate contact
with anyone who has not previously contacted it and may
not communicate with any persons already represented by
counsel. 74
Communications Regarding Defendant's Relationship with
Testing Firm - Murphy hired the Center for Toxicology and
Environmental Health, a private firm, to perform testing of
property affected by the oil spill and had stated in mailings
to residents that the Center had determined that there were
no longer health or safety hazards from the spill. Murphy
was ordered to disclose its relationship with the Center in all
public communications regarding it and that the Center was
not a governmental regulatory agency.75
Claimant Intake Forms - Murphy used intake forms in
processing claims that stated that the claimant consented to
testing of his property. Murphy was ordered to delete the
sentence that the claimant consented to testing. 76
Settlement and Release Agreement - Murphy used a settle-
ment and release agreement pursuant to paying claims that
contained numerous waivers using technical legal language.
Murphy was ordered to include a statement in any settle-
ment agreement that the individual should seek indepen-
dent legal advice prior to signing a settlement or waiver of
legal rights.'7
This order balanced defendants' First Amendment rights to communi-
cate with the need to protect the integrity of the opt-out right in a class
action. It did not spell out as precisely as did Judge Fallon's later decision
on capping of attorney's fees in Vioxx the reasoning for finding inherent
judicial authority over matters not directly involved in the MDL litigation
but affecting fairness and ethical standards. Together the two decisions
provide support for an MDL judge to oversee and monitor the conduct of
parties that affect settlement and resolution of the MDL litigation.
74. Id. at 8.
75. Id. at 9.
76. Id. at 10.
77. Id. at 11.
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B. The Court's Order in the BP Oil Spill Litigation
Judge Fallon's order in Murphy Oil clearly asserted judicial authority
to monitor the settlement and claims practices of a defendant. The BP Oil
Spill Litigation raised complaints of similar misleading communications
and practices particularly coming from a private claims facility. The Plain-
tiffs Screening Committee petitioned Judge Barbier to clarify and limit
public statements by Mr. Feinberg and the GCCF concerning the indepen-
dence of the facility and claimants' need for a lawyer in resolving their
claims and deciding whether to accept any offer. It cited statements by Mr.
Feinberg to the effect that claimants would be better off by not litigating
and instead resolving their claims through the GCCF. The PCS also cited
the fact that after criticisms were raised, BP, in an apparent attempt to
ensure that claimants had access to attorneys, hired several private law
firms to consult with claimants. The retained firms maintained that they
were independent of BP and that the fact that they were paid by BP would
not mean that they would abrogate their ethical responsibilities to the cli-
ent. Finally, the PSC sought court intervention concerning the kind of re-
lease required by the GCCF in order for a claimant to receive a final
payment. Claimants were required to release all possible responsible par-
ties, not just BP. As a private claim facility, the GCCF has a right to im-
pose such restrictions on payouts, but the requirement of a global release is
heavily weighted in favor of the interests of the defendants. If the facility is
to be viewed as a neutral entity with fair procedures, requiring a release of
all possible defendants may be unfair to claimants with genuine claims
against other defendants.
Judge Barbier granted a good part of the relief sought." First he
found that the GCCF and its administrator, Mr. Feinberg, were not inde-
pendent of BP, but rather a hybrid entity. The opinion focused on such
factors as the appointment of the administrator by BP without input of
claimants or the court, the difference in the administrator's role from a
"true third-party neutral" such as a mediator, arbitrator, or special master,
the fact that the GCCF and the administrator were not government agents,
and the fact that the GCCF sought settlement of claims that fell outside
OPA. It relied on precedents recognizing the authority of a court to con-
trol communications relating to pending MDL litigation while upholding
First Amendment principles:7 9
78. Order at 13-15, In re: Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mexico,
on April 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179 (E.D La. Feb. 2, 2011), available at http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/
OilSpill/Orders/2220110rderonRecDoc9l2.pdf.
79. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) §21.12, citing Gulf Oil v. Bernard, 452 U.S.
89, 101-02 (1981) ("Rule 23(d) authorizes the court to regulate communications with potential class
members, even before certification. Such regulations, however, could implicate the First Amend-
ment. . . . Judicial intervention is generally justified only on a clear record and with specific findings
that reflect a weighing of the need for a limitation and the potential interference with the rights of the
parties. Such intervention 'should result in a carefully drawn order that limits speech as little as possi-
ble, consistent with the rights of the parties under the circumstance.'").
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Judge Barbier ordered the GCCF and Administrator to:
(1) Refrain from contacting directly any claimant that they
know or reasonably should know is represented by counsel,
whether or not said claimant has filed a lawsuit or formal
claim;
(2) Refrain from referring to the GCCF, Ken Feinberg, or
Feinberg Rozen, LLP (or their representatives), as "neu-
tral" or completely "independent" from BP. It should be
clearly disclosed in all communications, whether written or
oral, that said parties are acting for and on behalf of BP in
fulfilling its statutory obligations as the "responsible party"
under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.
(3) Begin any communication with a putative class member
with the statement that the individual has a right to consult
with an attorney of his/her own choosing prior to accepting
any settlement or signing a release of legal rights.
(4) Refrain from giving or purporting to give legal advice to
unrepresented claimants, including advising that claimants
should not hire a lawyer.
(5) Fully disclose to claimants their options under OPA if
they do not accept a final payment, including filing a claim
in the pending MDL 2179 litigation.
(6) Advise claimants that the "pro bono" attorneys and
"community representatives" retained to assist GCCF
claimants are being compensated directly or indirectly by
BP.so
Judge Barbier made no ruling on the request to prevent BP from re-
quiring a release of all parties as a condition of receiving a final claim pay-
ment. Judge Fallon had also not addressed the release issue in Murphy Oil.
The release issue is complicated; courts are hesitant to interfere with the
bargaining behavior of parties in advance of a settlement, and the point at
which the terms of a settlement become so unfair as to be "unconsciona-
ble" is often difficult to draw. These court orders instead sought to ensure
transparency and prior legal advice so that claimants can appreciate the
significance of signing a global release.
V. CONCLUSION
The BP Oil Spill litigation is a gold mine for studying the administra-
tion of complex litigation. Upon transfer by the Panel on Multidistrict Liti-
gation, the transferee judge, Judge Carl Barbier, has been confronted with
a host of challenging issues and decisions. These relate to the proper role
80. In re Oil Spill, supra note 78, at 14.
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of a transferee judge under MDL, case management techniques (including
an intricate Trial Plan in the unique situation of a maritime law "Limita-
tion" proceeding), and the conduct of a claims process mandated by the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990. This involves applying a heady mix of statutory,
environmental, maritime, and common law to one of the most serious envi-
ronmental disasters in recent American history. It raises particular ques-
tions as to overreaching by a defendant in the conduct of its claims process
and as to the authority of MDL judges over a private claims process that is
independent of the MDL. Judge Barbier's decision in the BP Oil Spill liti-
gation concerning a judge's inherent power to limit the conduct of a private
claims facility built on prior orders by Judge Fallon in Murphy Oil concern-
ing communications with class members and in Vioxx concerning a cap on
the plaintiffs' attorneys' contingent fees. This litigation represents a further
development in the evolving supervisory powers of MDL judges and their
role in shaping the process in the interests of a fair and efficient settlement.
